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Abstract  
 
This paper visits the Brazilian capital income taxation to know whether and to what extent 
it is neutral to domestic investment decisions. The analysis was guided to help Brazilian 
authorities in the achievement of capital tax neutrality and improvement of the tax system 
efficiency. Based on the King-Fullerton methodology for computation of effective tax rates, 
this paper develops a framework to derive the pre-tax and post-tax rates of return on 
investment, the tax wedges and the correspondent effective tax rates in Brazil. This is to 
verify how the Brazilian tax system responds to different sources of finance, namely debt, 
retained earnings and new equity, and also to investment in three types of assets: machinery, 
buildings and inventories. Simulations have shown an unbalanced tax system: debt is the 
best fund option, inventories the worst choice for assets and the interest on net equity has 
small effect on improving tax neutrality.    
 
 
 
 
Key words: taxation, investment, capital, income, interest, debt, equity, neutrality, 
efficiency.
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the Brazilian model of capital income taxation in order 
to find out to what extent it is neutral to domestic investment decisions. The analysis was 
guided to help Brazilian authorities in the achievement of capital tax neutrality and 
improvement of the tax system efficiency. Neutrality matters because taxes may distort 
investment decisions. An investment that would be chosen in the absence of taxes may be 
skipped when taxes are levied and the opposite is also true. Thus, section 2 brings some 
concepts regarding the tax treatment of corporate finance such as debt and equity and the 
problem of double taxation of dividends. Basically, Brazil adopts two forms of equity relief: 
dividends are exempted from personal taxes and there is a deduction of what Brazilians call 
interest on net equity (INE) from the corporate tax base. Whilst most OECD2 countries use 
a classical system, imputation or even split rates; it is clear that Brazil has chosen a 
different policy as the interest on net equity (INE) seems to be rare in the public finance 
world. Section 2 also brings some tables with information from OECD countries regarding 
the tax treatment of different sources of corporate finance. Those tables allow comparisons 
between corporate taxation in Brazil and in OECD countries. After this conceptual 
overview, section 3 develops equations to compute the cost of corporate capital for 
domestic investors in Brazil based on the King-Fullerton model, a theoretical framework 
used by the OECD. We found expressions for the pre-tax and post-tax rates of return on 
investment, the tax wedges and the correspondent effective tax rates in Brazil. With this 
model, policy makers can verify how the Brazilian tax system responds to different sources 
of finance, namely debt, new equity (understood as the issuing of new shares), and retained 
earnings. Also, it is possible to compare investment decisions in three types of assets: 
                                                 
2 OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
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machinery, buildings and inventories. In section 4, we simulate different scenarios using 
equations developed in section 3. The initial settings correspond to the Brazilian tax 
environment with the corporate tax only. Next, we add personal income taxation. For each 
situation, we show a nine-cell table of tax wedges, combining the three types of assets with 
the three finance sources. Divergences among the nine tax wedges imply an unbalanced tax 
system that potentially encourages investors to privilege some particular form of asset and 
fund. Section 4 also shows the outcomes for a set of policy alternatives such as a lower 
interest rate, a higher corporate tax rate, a higher tax rate on interest, a lower proportion of 
stocks valued with FIFO and a zero tax rate on capital gains. In the end of section 4, there is 
a discussion for the achievement of tax neutrality.  In conclusion, this paper offers a tool for 
those interested in studying the impact of taxation on domestic investment in Brazil not 
only for academic purposes but for policy design as well. It sounds clear that the interest 
rate has a strong influence on the effective tax rates on investment. It is also noted that 
corrections on the tax system have to be carefully addressed because of the crossed-effects 
some variables have on others. Our simulations have shown debt as the best financial 
choice followed by new equity and retained earnings and the role of INE as an extra 
stimulus for tax neutrality between equity and debt is controversial as the results show INE 
has a very small impact on the cost of capital for new equity, though it seems to be praised 
by the business community. For assets, machinery and buildings show similar outcomes 
while inventories are heavily taxed if FIFO were the most used method for stock valuation. 
Assuming a small proportion of inventories valued with FIFO allows better results and even 
tax neutrality among assets.   
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Scope and Limitations 
It is important to mention that this paper has some limitations though: 
i. government revenues – some policy alternatives mentioned here can favor tax neutrality 
but their influence on government revenues is out of the scope of this paper. This study 
does not address this issue though it is critical for fiscal policy. Any result herein should 
be further complemented with the study of its impact on government revenues; 
ii. empirical evidence – results would be stronger if supported by empirical evidence. This 
is a theoretical analysis; 
iii. depreciation – further studies are needed to know effective depreciation rates in Brazil; 
iv. equity and justice – this paper does not discuss equity concerns; 
v. distribution of the tax burden – this paper does not discuss the distribution of the tax 
burden on specific people, sectors or factors of production; 
vi. assumptions – sometimes we take the same assumptions as the OECD to compute the 
overall tax wedges. For example, in the absence of the proportion of inventories 
submitted to FIFO or the proportion of capital gains realized each year, we used the 
same as the OECD, knowing that more research shall be done to the Brazilian case; 
vii. transnational investment – this work should be complemented by the study of the 
Brazilian tax system under international capital flows. It should be seen how far the tax 
system is from capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN); 
viii. evasion and avoidance – for simplicity, there is no evasion and avoidance in the model.  
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2. Taxation of Corporate Capital  
2.1   Economic Double Taxation  
The first studies on double taxation of dividends were based on the tax treatment of a 
classical system. Under such a system, corporate profits are taxed according to accounting 
procedures and dividends paid to shareholders are taxed again. Since the same profit stream 
is taxed first at the corporation level and secondly at the individual level, complaints 
pointed out the existence of the economic double taxation3 problem, which would have 
negative effects on the financing of new business projects that had been based on the input 
of capital from shareholders. This was the reasoning of economists who supported the "old 
vision" as it is known in the taxation literature. For them, the classical system favors debt, 
which is the preferred source of financing for businesses. This is because the interest paid 
on loans is deductible from the corporate tax base. Thus, researchers predicted that in the 
long term many companies would face bankruptcy, causing the collapse of the economic 
system. In order to avoid it, those experts said dividends should be exempted from taxation 
as an important measure for preventing a differential tax treatment between the two main 
sources of business finance: equity and debt.  
This doctrinal position was later challenged by supporters of the "new vision", who 
believed that dividend exemption would not provide equal tax treatment for equity and debt. 
Instead, it would simply generate windfall gains to shareholders, those gains disconnected 
from the business activity. The supporters of the new vision, however, made clear that this 
hypothesis would apply only to mature corporations and for new businesses the 
formulations of the old vision experts could be correct. 
                                                 
3  Double taxation of profits can be seen in two ways: economic or juridical. While the former is the object of 
this paper, the latter has been used when two jurisdictions tax the income of a corporation or an individual. In 
general, tax treaties between countries are used to avoid the juridical double taxation.  
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2.2  Integration  
Countries use to choose different systems of capital taxation. The U.S. adopts the classical 
system while countries such as France, Italy and Germany choose integrated tax systems in 
order to reduce the problem of economic double taxation. Obviously, there was a strong 
reason to do it. Capital mobility has become intense with globalization, which raised the 
risk for classical system countries in Europe. This means they could have their tax bases 
fast eroded as long as corporations could move to lower tax jurisdictions. To avoid it, some 
countries adopted the imputation or credit taxation method while others preferred the use of 
different rates, which is known as the split rates taxation method. In the first case, a credit 
is allowed to the natural person on her tax return in order to compensate the withholding tax 
on dividends. In the second case, the withholding tax on dividends is worth less than a rate 
that is normally used for other income from capital. In both cases, the idea is to make the 
sum of the tax paid at the corporation level and at the individual level equal to the resulting 
application of the basic capital tax rate on the total income. 
 Interesting to note that while most OECD countries use the classical system or integrated 
systems with the imputation method or the split rates method, Brazil has allowed full 
exemption for dividends and also introduced the so called interest on net equity (INE), 
which is deductible from the corporate tax base.   
The following subsections comment on the main features of the three sources of finance: 
equity, debt and retained earnings. Next, we address some important elements of income 
taxation, i.e. issues that shape the tax base and tax rates. These concepts are needed for 
modeling Brazilian tax system with King-Fullerton equations on section 3.  
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2.3 Equity 
2.3.1 Dividends Exemption 
 
The tax treatment of dividends in Brazil is ruled by Act Nr. 9249/1995, which exempts paid 
dividends from the individual income tax. It forbids retentions on dividends and distinctions 
between domestic and foreign investors. Dividend exemption occurs whatever be the 
amount of corporate tax paid. Other traditional solutions for the problem of economic 
double taxation also include the imputation or the split rate4 methods. Table 2.1 shows a 
brief of dividend tax treatment in some OECD countries and in Brazil. 
Table 2.1 – Dividends Taxation in Selected Countries 
Country Dividend Taxation Remarks 
Germany Split rates 
 
Individual income tax rate on ½ of distributed 
dividends.  
Brazil Exemption  -  
USA Classical system Dividends are grossed up on the personal income 
tax return. The marginal rate is usually  31%. 
However, there is exemption in some cases. 
France Imputation Individuals receive a credit of maximum of half of 
the tax paid by the corporation. 
Netherlands Exemption  -  
Italy Imputation Individuals receive a credit of maximum of  36/64 
of net dividends. 
Sources: IBFD, OECD and SRF. 
 
We have shown that scholars of the new view believed dividends exemption does not 
encourage investment for mature companies but for young corporations only. In spite of it, 
Brazil and the Netherlands adopted dividend exemption, perhaps supporting a clear 
                                                 
4 A good description of the split rate and imputation methods with examples can be seen in the IMF Tax 
Policy Handbook. 
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advantage of this policy in terms of administrative simplicity. In fact, credit systems have 
been criticized for being costly and complex.  
  
2.3.2 Interest on Net Equity 
Act Nr. 9249/1995 also created the interest on net equity (INE)5 , which similarly to 
dividends, is paid to shareholders. There are significant differences, however. INE payment 
is conditioned to the existence of current or retained profits and its computation depends on 
the long-term interest rate6 and the company net equity at the beginning of the fiscal term. 
INE taxation is similar to debt interest. INE can be deducted from the tax base and the 
income tax is retained at source at a rate7 of 15% at the time of payment. INE is non-neutral 
to foreign investment since the tax is final for foreign companies and individuals but it can 
be deducted from the tax base of domestic companies.  
INE provides choices for company managers to please shareholders. First, they may choose 
to pay the corporate tax and dividends, the latter being exempted from taxation. Second, 
they may deduct the INE paid to shareholders from the tax base and this is taxed at the 
statutory rate of 15% retained at source. Finally, they may choose a combination of both, 
which may satisfy the minimum dividend distribution and help managers to program 
financial outflows. Indeed, the revenue collected with INE taxation rose twelve times from 
its creation in 1996 till 2002.8  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The Portuguese term for INE is “juros sobre o capital próprio”.  
6 The long-term interest rate in Brazil is known as TJLP, which is usually lower than the official short-term 
interest rate SELIC. 
7 The INE tax rate of 15%  is the same tax rate on debt interest. 
8 Data available at the SRF website. 
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2.4 Debt 
Besides equity alternatives, corporations may also finance new projects with debt. The tax 
rates for interest vary according to the lender, the loan time, the existence of international 
treaty but in most cases it is 15% and the tax is retained at source at the time of payment.  
As most countries, Brazil allows full deduction of interest from the corporate tax base. 
Since dividends cannot be deducted, debt finance has a clear advantage against equity 
finance. This probably led Brazilian legislators to create the interest on net equity (INE), 
attempting to achieve a neutral tax treatment between equity and debt. This paper addresses 
this issue on section 4. 
In 1991, fourteen OECD countries taxed interest paid to residents with rates varying from 
10% to 35%. Some countries provided no tax at interest at all and all jurisdictions allow 
deduction of interest paid from the corporate tax base. Taxation of interest paid to non-
residents usually depended on the existence of an international tax treaty. Table 2.2 shows a 
brief of interest tax treatment in Brazil and in some OECD countries. 
  Table 2.2 – Interest Taxation in Selected Countries 
Country Tax Rate (%)  Deduction 
From Tax Base ? 
Germany Zero Yes 
Brazil 15 - 25  Yes  
USA Zero – 30 Yes  
France Zero Yes  
Netherlands Zero Yes  
Italy 12,5 – 30 Yes  
Portugal 10 – 25 Yes 
Sources: OCDE and SRF. 
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2.5 Capital Gains 
Retained profits are another financial alternative. Instead of loans or shareholders’ new 
capital, companies may choose to retain profits to support new investment. In this case, 
taxation on shareholders is imposed on capital gains9, which are taxed only at the time of 
realization at a rate of 15% in Brazil.10 
Most OECD countries tax capital gains at a rate equal or close to the corporate tax rate. 
Some countries exempt capital gains invested in the company while others provide relief 
considering the time the share capital was held.     
 
Table 2.3 – Capital Gains Taxation in Selected Countries 
Country Tax Rate (%)* Remarks 
Germany Zero Ordinary shares are exempted  
Brazil 15% - 
USA 7% - 
France 26% - 
Netherlands Zero Ordinary shares are exempted   
Portugal 3,6% - 12% Rates decrease as time increases 
Sources: IBFD, OCDE and SRF. 
* considering ordinary shares only. 
 
2.6 The Corporate Tax Base  
The following items are some of the most important elements to define cross-countries 
differences at the corporate tax base. 
i. Treatment of Losses: In Brazil, trading losses may be carried forward as it is the case in all 
OECD countries. However, Brazil imposes a limit of 30% of loss compensation per fiscal 
year. Brazil does not allow losses to be carried back. 
                                                 
9 The term capital gains in Brazil may refer to other forms of capital than corporate capital. In this paper 
though, capital gains refer to company´s valuation. 
10 There are several rates for capital gains taxation in Brazil and we took 15% because this is the same rate for 
interest and INE, which favors comparisons here.     
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ii. Depreciation Allowances: Brazil allows the straight line (L) method only. The declining 
balance method (D), which is used in most OECD countries, is not permitted in Brazil. 
Table 2.4 presents depreciation methods and rates of selected countries. Regulation IN SRF 
162/98 establishes statutory depreciation rates for several kinds of assets in Brazil. Typical 
statutory rates for machinery and buildings are 10% and 4% per year, respectively. The 
same depreciation rate is applied until the asset is fully depreciated and there are no first 
year special rates.11  regions or projects in industry or agriculture.  
 
Table 2.4 – Depreciation Allowances in Selected Countries 
Method  Typical Rates Country 
Machines Buildings Machines Buildings 
Germany L/D L 10% or 3L12 2.5% – 10% 
Brazil L L 10% 4% 
Canada D D 25% 4% 
USA L/D L 14.3% or 2L 3.2% 
France L/D L 10% -  20% or 1.5L 5% 
Netherlands L/D L/D 10% - 15% or 2L 3.3% or 2L 
Japan L/D L/D 10% or 3L 2.2% – 4.3% or 3L 
Sources: OCDE and SRF. 
iii. Tax Incentives: Investment Relieves and Deferrals: As a general rule, Brazil does not 
provide allowances or credits as investment relief and no deferrals are permitted.  
iv. Inventories:  Table 2.5 shows inventories treatment in selected countries. Only the methods 
FIFO (fisrt in first out) and the average cost are allowed in Brazil. The LIFO (last in first 
out) is not permitted. As a result, increases in the value of inventories due solely to inflation 
may be taxed. 
                                                 
11 Brazilian tax code has also special depreciation rates for some projects in industry or agriculture. However, 
such incentives are exceptions to the general depreciation rule. 
12 In the declining balanced method, the book value of an asset is multiplied by a fixed rate, usually two or 
three times the straight line depreciation rate.   
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Table 2.5 – Inventories Tax Treatment in Selected Countries 
Country FIFO  LIFO 
Germany No Yes  
Brazil Yes No 
Spain Yes  No 
USA Yes  Yes 
Japan Yes  Yes  
Source: OCDE and SRF. 
v. Research and Development (R&D): in Brazil, the cost of research is usually not deductible 
in the first year as it is the case in most OECD countries but must be spread over a number 
of years. It is notable, however, that incentives for research and development are usual in 
many countries. Japan and the US, for example, have incentives for R&D for a long time.  
2.7  The Corporate Tax Rate 
In Brazil, there is corporate tax only at the federal level. However, countries such as the 
USA and Canada allow corporate taxation to subnational governments as well. The 
statutory rate in Brazil is 15%, the same for capital gains, interests and rents. However, an 
additional 10% rate is applied whenever a company exceeds a certain profit threshold. This 
raises the average corporate tax rate to usually 25%. Moreover, there is another tax on 
companies net profits, called the social contribution on net profits (CSLL) that has a 9% 
statutory rate and its base is very close to the corporate tax. Thus, we sum up all these rates 
to say that Brazilian corporate taxation is charged at a statutory rate of 34% as a general 
rule. Table 2.6 shows some countries statutory corporate tax rates. Note that Brazil has one 
of the lowest rates among selected countries. 
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Table 2.6 – Corporate Tax Rates in Selected Countries 
Country Corporate Tax Rate* (%) 
Germany 56.5 
Brazil 34 
Italy 47.8 
Netherlands 35 
USA 38.3 
Source:  OCDE and SRF. 
*includes all levels of government. 
 
2.8 Withholding Taxes  
Some countries make use of withholding taxes as specific taxes on interest or capital gains. 
In Brazil, the income tax code encompasses the individual income tax, the corporate tax and 
it has provisions for retention at source on interest and capital gains, usually at a rate of 
15%. It means that though Brazilian tax code does not have specific withholding taxes, the 
economic effect of its provisions is the same as in other countries that adopt withholding 
taxes. 13 
 
3. Developing a Model for Brazil 
 
In this section, we use the King Fullerton methodology to find the expressions for the real 
required pre-tax rate of return “p” on Brazilian domestic investment, the post-tax rate of 
return on investment “s”, effective tax rates and the tax wedges as differences between “p” 
and “s”, by definition. We derive these variables for different types of assets, i.e. machinery, 
buildings and inventories; and different sources of corporations’ funds, i.e. debt, new equity 
and retained earnings. 
  
                                                 
13 Remember that the Brazilian interest on net equity (INE) is also subject to retention at source at a rate of 
15%. 
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3.1 - The Post- Tax Rate of Return 
The basic idea is that a domestic investor would not finance a new corporate project unless 
it is offering him/her a return on investment higher than the rate one can obtain at the 
money market, buying government bonds, for instance. Thus, a rough idea for the 
equilibrium post-tax rate of return “s” is simply to make it equal to the nominal interest rate 
“i”, considering no taxes and no inflation in the economy at this moment, for simplicity.  
s ≈  i  
Note that the first term above corresponds to the company financial behavior while the 
second term features the market.  
Now suppose there is tax on interest which is retained at source. If the investor could buy 
bonds, as said, then he or she would have to pay the tax. This means that the opportunity 
cost to invest in the company would require a lower post-tax rate of return than that without 
the tax. Hence, the after-tax rate of return on investment should be the market interest rate 
reduced by the tax, thus: 
)1( i
is ω+=  
Where ωi is the tax rate on interest retained at source.   
Besides taxes, a rational investor would look at the real interest rate and take inflation into 
account. Thus:  
1
1
)1(
1
−+
++= π
ω i
i
s
                                                  or 
  
1
)1(*)1(
1 −++
++= πω
ω
i
iis                      (1) 
Where π is the inflation rate.  
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Following King and Fullerton steps and in order to compare financial alternatives, we 
assume that all investments have the same after-tax rate of return “s”. Differences should 
appear when computing the pre-tax rates of return “p” for different assets and sources of 
finance. For a given after-tax rate of return on investment, taxes will probably raise the 
need for capital and the required pre-tax rate of return on investment will likely rise. 
However, the lower the pre-tax rate of return on investment, the better for the investor. 
Therefore, an investor should look at the required pre-tax rate of return on investment “p”, 
which is usually higher than “s”, in order to check if the investment is worthwhile.  
Exemplification can make things clear. An investment that would be profitable at, say, 2% 
after tax, and requires a 5% rate of return before tax, should be preferred against other with 
8% rate of return before tax because the first is easier to achieve and make profits, meaning 
that for all rates of return higher than 5% investors will earn a profit while in the second 
case the rates should be higher than 8%. On the other hand, if an investment would earn 4% 
before tax, it should be avoided because it has to offer at least 5% in order to be profitable. 
In this sense, all investments that in the absence of taxes would be profitable at rates 
between 2% and 5% will not when taxes are involved. How to derive “p” for Brazil is the 
task we do next. 
 
3.2 - The Pre-Tax Rate of Return  
The pre-tax rate of return on investment is also called the cost of capital. The King-
Fullerton model takes the cost of capital as a function of the real interest rate “r” and 
assumes that the required pre-tax rate of return is given by a function c(r). The real interest 
rate here is an exogenous variable. As mentioned, to compare investment projects we 
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suppose all projects should have the same after-tax rate of return “s” and for a certain type 
of asset the cost of capital will be given by the marginal rate of return (MRR) less the 
economic depreciation rate for that asset (δ). Thus: 
δ−== MRRrcp )(          (2) 
Function c(r) returns a percent value for a given r. The monetary value C shall be computed 
as the product of c(r) per the cost of the asset expressed in real currency. Because the model 
works with marginal values, the acquisition cost of an asset is taken as one ($ 1.00). Thus, 
at the margin, the cost of capital of a given asset (C) is one minus its whole marginal 
depreciation (A): 
 AC −=1                                                                 (3) 
Be V the current marginal value of a profit stream obtained with the asset. The minimum 
value of V that makes investment on that asset worthwhile is simply C, the marginal cost of 
capital. Thus: 
ACV −== 1min       (4) 
We also may think of V as a sum of all marginal rates of return (MRR) obtained with the 
asset during a given period of time.  To be precise, these marginal rates of return shall be 
clean of taxes and consider inflation. For a given project or asset, the initial MRR will fall 
in time as depreciation advances. The exponential function usually represents the effects of 
depreciation in time. Thus, we get expression 5 as: 
dtMRV xt∫ −+−= Re)1)(1( πτ                            (5) 
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 Where τ is the tax rate. The exponent of the exponential function shall encompass not only 
depreciation rates but all that affects the rates of return in time. It means it has the economic 
depreciation rate but it also has the inflation rate, which increases depreciation and the rates 
of return in the future, and also the discount rate (ρ) that decreases the rates of return. Thus 
expression 6 is:  
  dtMRV t∫ −++−+−= ))1((Re)1)(1( πρπδπτ             (6) 
The integral above can be computed from time zero to infinity, given: 
1
)1(
*)1)(1( −++−
+−= πδπρ
πτ MRRV                                             (7) 
Replacing V by (1 – A) and rearranging, we get: 
)1(*)1(
))1((*)1(
πτ
πδπρ
++
++−−= AMRR                               (8) 
Returning to expression 2 we find the pre-tax marginal rate of return as: 
δπτ
πδπρ −++
++−−=
)1(*)1(
))1((*)1( Ap                                (9) 
Expression 9 is adequate to derive the cost of capital for investments in machines and 
buildings. For inventories evaluated with FIFO, the only method allowed in Brazil, there 
must be a correction for the effects of inflation. Remember that inventories are accounted 
for their acquisition values and suffer no depreciation. Expression 10 is then: 
 
δπτ
τυππδπρ −++
+++−−=
)1(*)1(
))1((*)1( Ap                      (10) 
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Where ν is the proportion of inventories valued with FIFO. 
Expression 10 gives the cost of capital “p” as a function of the company discount rate “ρ”. 
However, policymakers are interested in the cost of capital as a function of the interest rate 
as in expression 2. Because relations between the interest rate and the company discount 
rate will depend on the source of finance, it is necessary to develop equations for equity, 
debt and retained earnings.  
A first approach or a rough idea for such equations is based on the fact that in the absence 
of taxes, inflation and other variables that affect the return to investment, it would be 
reasonable to suppose ρ = i , meaning that an investment in the company has to return at 
least the market interest rate. Truly, the left term should be the effective company discount 
rate and for the three sources of finance it has to be changed accordingly. Notice that again 
the left term reflects the company behavior while the right term is dedicated to the market. 
 
3.3 - The Company Discount Rate  
For debt finance, the left term is still the company discount rate “ρ” because shareholders 
are not directly affected in a loan as capital is borrowed from third parties, i.e. banks, 
financial institutions and even other corporations. 14  The right term is the interest rate 
reduced by a percent that equals the corporate tax rate. This is because interest is deducted 
from the corporate tax base:   
)1(* τρ −= i           (11) 
                                                 
14 In Brazil, elusive schemes appeared when shareholders “lent” money to their own companies to take 
advantage of interest deduction. Perhaps it could have been one of the reasons interest on net equity was 
created. Expression 11 does not support this special case. 
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Expression 11 shows very important features of debt finance. First, there is no influence of 
the income tax at the personal level on the return to investment. Second, the only 
instrument tax policy has to influence debt preferences is the (effective) corporate tax rate. 
The interest rate is crucial but it is a Central Bank issue and it is out of control for fiscal 
policy authorities. Another important conclusion from expression 11 is that investment is 
easier viable with debt because a return inferior to the interest rate would satisfy.     
For equity, the right term (or the market condition) changes. Now there is no deduction 
from the corporate tax base.15  Investors are now shareholders who would require at least 
the market interest rate freed from personal taxes, i.e. i /(1 + ωi), where i is the nominal 
interest rate and ωi is the income tax rate for interest income, considering retention at 
source. 16  
The left term for retained earnings shall consider the income tax rate on capital gains and 
the effects of inflation. The company discount rate is reduced by the capital gains taxation 
as shareholders have to pay it at the time if realization and inform it when filling their tax 
returns (no retention at source). Thus: 
)1(
)1( i
izz ωπρ +=+−                         (12) 
Where z is the effective tax rate on capital gains. Because capital gains are taxed only at the 
time of realization17, the term zπ has to be added. 
                                                 
15 Though there is deduction for INE in Brazil. 
16 The King-Fullerton´s original expression is i (1- mi), where mi   is the marginal rate on interest income paid 
to natural persons when filling their tax returns. In Brazil, the tax on interest is charged as a retention at source 
and the expression shall be changed accordingly.  
17 At least this is the general rule. 
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Assuming λ as a number that represents the proportion of capital gains realized each year, 
King presents the following expression for conversion of the statutory tax rate on capital 
gains (zs) to the effective rate z.  
πλ
λ
++= s
zz s*                           (13) 
For new capital from shareholders, King-Fullerton developed expression 14: 
i
d
izm ωπθρ +=+− 1)1(*            (14) 
Where md is the marginal income tax rate on dividends and θ is the tax discrimination 
variable that represents the opportunity cost of profit retention expressed in terms of non-
distributed dividends. Variable θ is defined as the additional dividend shareholders could 
receive if one real of retained earnings were distributed. Thus, if $1 (one real) in profits 
were distributed, shareholders receive $θ and $ (1 - θ) will be paid as taxes. Consequently, 
(1 - θ) / θ is the additional taxation per unity of distributed dividends. Note that θ is taken at 
the corporate level and does not consider tax incidence at the personal level. Hence, in a 
classic system, as in the USA, there is no additional taxation on distributed dividends at the 
corporate level and θ equals one. In a system with credits though, θ can be greater than one.  
Expression 14 has to be changed for Brazil because dividends are exempted from taxation. 
Furthermore, there is INE as a new way to pay shareholders. Considering first the only 
existence of exempted dividends: 
πωρ z
i
i
−+= 1       (15) 
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As θ = 1 and md = 0. The term zπ is still here because of the effects on inflation on capital 
gains till the time dividends are distributed (distribution occurs usually once or twice per 
year). However, if we suppose there is only INE, the expression is: 
 
ij
iz ω
τπω
ρθ
+
−=++ 1
)1(
1
      (16) 
The company discount rate is reduced by the retention at source of the income tax on INE, 
which gives the term 1 + ωj at the denominator, where ωj is the income tax rate on INE, 
which is retained at source. The term zπ means the effect of inflation on retained profits till 
INE is paid. The right term appears with the component (1 - τ) because INE is deductible 
from the corporate tax base. Similarly as in the debt case, this term pushes down the 
required return for investment.  
Now a closer look at θ, which is now the net INE in hands of shareholders after the income 
tax is paid. The expression for θ considers the retention at source on INE:  
jωθ += 1
1                            (17)  
Thus, expression 16 becomes: 
ij
iz ω
τπω
ρθ
+
−=++ 1
)1(
)1( 2
                  and 
Considering  INE tax rate as the same as the interest tax rate, then ωj equals ωi: 
                                    ))1(*(*)1( πτωρ zii −−+=                               (18) 
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Now expressions 15 and 18 have to be integrated for equity as dividends or INE as both can 
be distributed at the same time. Variable ε indicates the proportion of distributed profits as 
dividends while (1 - ε) is the proportion of distributed profits that corresponds to INE. Thus, 
combining expressions 15 and 18 the company discount rate ρ for contribution of new 
capital from shareholders is: 
))1(*(*)1(*)1()
1
(* πτωεπωερ ziz
i
i
i
−−+−+−+=             (19) 
 
In sum, according to the King-Fullerton model, the cost of domestic capital in Brazil can be 
computed by expressions 9 and 10 in terms of the company discount rate, which, in turn, 
can be expressed as a function of the nominal interest rate according to expressions 11, 12 
and 19, considering the source of finance debt, retained earnings or new shares, respectively. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main expressions for Brazil. 
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Table 3.1 – Pre-tax and Post-tax Rates of Return Expressions for the Brazilian Tax System 
Variable Expression 
After-tax rate of return to 
capital 1
)1(*)1(
1 −++
++= πω
ω
i
iis     
Pre-tax rate of return to 
capital δπτ
τυππδπρ −++
+++−−=
)1(*)1(
))1((*)1( Ap  
Company discount rate  
debt finance 
)1(* τρ −= i  
Company discount rate  
retained earnings  
ρ = [i /( 1 + ωi  ) - zπ] / ( 1 – z) 
Company discount rate  
equity finance - new shares  
 
))1(*(*)1(*)1()
1
(* πτωεπωερ ziz
i
i
i
−−+−+−+=  
Adapted from the King-Fullerton work to the Brazilian income taxation. 
 
 
4. Policy Analisys 
In this section, we compute the after-tax rate and the pre-tax rate of return on investment for 
the Brazilian tax system, considering three financial sources: debt, retained earnings and 
new equity; and three kinds of assets: machineries, buildings and inventories. We also 
compute the effective tax rates and the tax wedges, i.e., the differences between the pre and 
the post-tax rates of return on capital. In the end of this section we test the tax system 
neutrality under some hypothesis.  
4.1 Computing Tax Wedges without Personal Taxation  
In the starting point, we assume there is only corporate taxation and there are no personal 
taxes and no retentions at source. Also, there is no interest on net equity (INE). The initial 
settings for some of the model parameters are: 
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i. the nominal interest rate (i) - The nominal interest rate in Brazil is taken as 16%18. 
However, sometimes we should also use the real interest rate of 5% in order to  
compare our results with OECD countries. This is important because one may want to 
evaluate the potential distortions the Brazilian tax system have on investment.  
 
ii. the corporate tax rate (τ) – this is initially assumed to be 25%, as a result of the sum of 
15% of the statutory corporate tax rate and its 10% additional rate (almost always 
applied to big companies). In the following sections we discuss variations on τ.19 
iii. the inflation rate (π) – this is assumed as 4.5%, following the Brazilian official forecast 
for 2004.20 
iv. statutory depreciation rates (δ) – these are 10% for machinery and 4% for buildings. For 
inventories the rate is zero. 
 
Step 1: Finding the post-tax rate of return to investors  
 
According to expression (1) and without personal taxes, the post-tax rate of return “s” 
equals the real interest rate: s = 11.0%. The statutory income tax rate on domestic interest 
was taken as zero.  
Step 2: Finding the company discount rate for each type of finance   
For retained earnings and new equity, the company discount rate equals the nominal interest 
rate ( ρ = i = 16%), since there are no taxes on dividends, capital gains or INE. For debt, ρ = 
(1-τ)i  =  12%. Observe that the company discount rate is lower for debt than for equity and 
retention.      
Step 3: Finding the present value of depreciation allowances (A) 
Brazil has only the straight line (L) method. The expression for A is: 
                                                 
18 As currently defined by the Brazilian Central Bank for May, 2004. 
19 For a while we ignore the effect of the CSLL, the social contribution on net profit. 
20 As the Brazilian Central Bank website http://www.bacen.gov.br/?SISMETAS, site visited at June 9, 2004. 
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)
)1(
11(*)1( n
thA ρρ
ρτδ
+−
+=      (20) 
                                                                       
Where “n” is the number of years for which a depreciation allowance can be claimed. 
Remember ρ is the company discount rate and depends on the type of financing. Thus, we 
have: 
 
Table 4.1 – Present Value of Depreciation Allowances (A) – Basic Assumptions 
Machinery Buildings 
New equity New equity Retained    
earnings  
Debt 
 
Retained 
earnings  
Debt 
 
0.140 0.140 0.158 0.071 0.071 0.088 
Author´s computation. 
The present value of depreciation allowances is bigger for machinery than it is for buildings 
and the source of finance matters too. It is the same for new equity and retention, but higher 
for debt. 
 
Step 4: Finding the required pre-tax rate of return on capital  
 
The pre-tax rate of return is computed according to expression 10. Now, δ is the economic 
depreciation, which is assumed to be 8.2% for machinery, 2.7% for buildings and zero for 
inventories. 21 The proportion of inventories valued using the FIFO method (ν) is assumed 
as 100% in Brazil, where LIFO is not permitted. Therefore, we have: 
 
Table 4.2 – Pre-tax Rates of Return in Brazil (%) – corporate taxation only 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories 
Retained earnings 13.8 14.3 16.1 
New equity 13.8 14.3 16.1 
Debt 9.1 9.3 11.0 
Author´s computation. 
                                                 
21 Depreciation rates as in Feu (2004). 
  
 
 29
These results show that in the absence of personal taxes the Brazilian tax system would 
favor debt though it would be neutral to retained earnings and new equity. Also, it would 
give a similar treatment to machinery and buildings while inventories are heavily taxed.  
Debt advantage comes mainly from the possibility of interest deduction from the tax base. 
The high values of “p” indicate the tax system imposes a high cost on capital investment.  
Step 5: Finding the average pre-tax rates of return 
Weights are necessary to get an overall “p”, which comes from a weighted average of the 
nine possibilities in the table above. Weights are given as the proportion of investment on 
each type of asset and the proportion of company finance from each source of funds. 
Unfortunately, data from Brazilian assets and finance sources are not available and we take 
the OECD average weight instead. This approach has the advantage of making the Brazilian 
tax system model comparable to the tax systems in the OECD area. Thus, these come out 
with 50% for machinery, 28% for buildings and 22 % for inventories; and 35% for debt, 
10% for new equity and 55% for retentions. Table 4.3 shows the results.   
 
Table 4.3 – Average Pre-Tax Rate of Return in Brazil (%) – Corporate tax only 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
13.8 14.3 16.1 14.5 
New equity 13.8 14.3 16.1 14.5 
Debt 9.1 9.3 11.0 9.6 
Average 12.2 12.5 14.3 12.7 
Author´s computation 
The use of weights has some limitations though. For instance, it supposes an 
equiproportional increase in the capital stock, financed in the same way as the existing 
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stock.22 In spite of it, it is possible to conclude that the system potentially distorts finance 
decisions in favor of debt. Also, it is clear that investing in inventories requires a higher 
cost of capital. 
Step 6: Finding the tax wedges 
The tax wedge is defined by the difference between the pre and the post-tax rates of return, 
i.e. “p – s”. Based on steps 1 and 5, we have the following tax wedges in each cell of the 
table: 
Table 4.4 – Tax Wedges (p-s) for Brazilian tax system (%) – Corporate taxation only 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
2.8 3.3 5.1 3.5 
New equity 2.8 3.3 5.1 3.5 
Debt -1.9 -1.7 0.0 -1.4 
Average 1.2 1.5 3.3 1.7 
Author´s computation 
In the absence of taxation on interest, there are negative tax wedges on debt finance, which 
means government would be funding projects financed by debt together with the private 
sector. Note that a zero tax rate on interest in this situation implies more than revenue 
resigns but a truly incentive to debt funding, perhaps not granted according to the will of 
government.  
Step 7: Finding effective tax rates 
King and Fullerton compute effective tax rates under two ways: first, dividing tax wedges 
by “p” and, second, dividing tax wedges by “s”. In the first case, denominator “p” includes 
                                                 
22 To get more details about the limitations and the use of these weights, please consult the section C, chapter 
four of the OECD publication “Taxing Profits in a Global Economy”, Paris, 1991. 
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taxes and in the second case the effective tax rate is based on net income. Thus, taking the 
first case, these are the following effective tax rates:   
 
Table 4.5 – Effective tax rates for Brazil (p-s)/p  (%) – Corporate taxation only 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
20.4 23.0 31.7 23.6 
New equity 20.4 23.0 31.7 23.6 
Debt -21.4 -18.1 0.0 -15.8 
Average 5.8 8.6 20.6 9.8 
Author´s computation 
4.2 Computing Effective Tax Wedges with Personal Taxes  
 
Above we suppose the absence of personal taxes. Now, we include personal taxes to reach a 
more realistic computation of tax wedges in Brazil. Without such taxes, the tax system 
gives the same treatment for retained earnings and new equity and machinery and buildings 
results are very close. However, with personal taxes this neutrality disappears. 
 
Step 1: Finding the post-tax rate of return to investors  
 
Using expression (1), we find:   
 
       s = 9.0% 
The statutory income tax rate on domestic interest was taken as 15%. As a general rule, the 
tax is retained at source. Because “s” is a high rate (higher than any other OECD country in 
1991), we could expect that most investors would buy Brazilian bonds rather than invest in 
the real economy. Moreover, high after-tax rates of return mean that required pre-tax rates 
can be even higher. Thus, the tax system may discourage direct investment in Brazil as long 
as it requires very high rates of return. Indeed, disregarding risks involved, a rational 
portfolio investor could give up a high bond rate in favor of real investment only if this 
could offer him/her an even higher rate of return, which can be hard to achieve. It should be 
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noted, however, that this high after-tax rate of return is strongly influenced by the interest 
rate and in coming-up sections we simulate the effect of a lower interest rate. Another point 
is that income tax incentives to foster investment can be of poor effectiveness with such a 
high after-tax rate of return.   
 
Step 2: Find the company’s discount rate  
 
Using the expressions of table 3.7, we find the company´s discount rate for the three 
sources of finance. Consider ωi the tax rate on interest retained at source as 15%. Note that 
it is true that Brazil has more than one income tax rate on interest (depending on the 
operation). But we use 15% here because it is the same rate used for capital gains. As we 
are testing for neutrality, if we suppose statutory tax rates are identical then different tax 
wedges are clearly not due to rates but to the tax system design.  
About dividends, Brazil imposes no personal taxes on dividends. Remember that for a 
while there is no interest on net equity (INE) and ε equals one. This is to check the isolated 
effects of dividend exemption or how this policy compares to the other sources of finance. 
Nevertheless, we will look at INE afterwards. Thus, expression of the company discount 
rate for new equity is simply: 
                                                     πωρ z
i
i
−+= 1  
 
The last expression is a simplified version of expression 19, without INE. The term “z” is 
the effective capital gain tax rate, which is computed from the expression: 
 
πλ
λ
++= s
zz s*                                                               (13) 
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Where λ is the proportion of capital gains realized each year in Brazil, taken as 10%, as said 
in section 3;  “s” is the after-tax rate of return on investment found as 9% in step one; zs is 
the statutory capital gains tax rate, which is 15% and π is the inflation rate of 4.5%. Thus, 
the value of  z is 6,4%.  
Note that the effective tax rate on capital gains is lower than the statutory rate as expected, 
basically because capital gains are taxed only at the time of realization. Although this may 
be source of criticism this policy is used in almost all developed economies.         
 
Now we are able to revisit table 3.7 expressions for the company discount rate: 
 
retained earnings:  ρ = 14.6% , 
new Equity:            ρ = 13.6% , 
debt:                        ρ = 12.0% , the same as in the last section. 
Hence, personal taxation does not change the company discount rate for debt finance but 
for equity and retention. In Brazil, we have seen that the company discount rates were equal 
for retained earnings and new equity in the absence of personal taxation. By computing 
personal taxes on capital gains and the dividend exemption, it is clear that there is no longer 
neutral treatment between them, though both have now lower discount rates (the previous 
section showed the discount rate of 16% for both new equity and retention). Dividends 
exemption has a higher impact on the company discount rate than capital gains taxation. 
Still, debt continues to be the best financial option till this point.   
 
Step 3: Finding the present value of depreciation allowances  
 
We use expression 20 again and the results are: 
 
 
Table 4.6 – Present Value of Depreciation Allowances (A) – with Personal Taxes 
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Machinery Buildings 
New equity New equity Retained    
earnings  
Debt 
 
Retained 
earnings  
Debt 
 
0.146 0.150 0.158 0.076 0.080 0.088 
Author´s computation 
 
 
Step 4: Finding the required pre-tax rate of return 
 
From table 3.7 and the previous steps, we have: 
 
Table 4.7 - Pre-tax Rates of Return with Personal Taxes  (%) 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories 
Retained earnings 12.1 12.5 14.3 
New equity 11.0 11.3 13.1 
Debt 9.1 9.3 11.0 
Author´s computation 
 
Step 5: Finding the average pre-tax rates of return  
 
Again, the weights are 50% for machinery, 28% for buildings and 22 % for inventories; and 
35% for debt, 10% for new equity and 55% for retentions. The following table shows the 
results. 
Table 4.8 - Pre-tax Rates of Return (%) - with Personal Taxes - Average 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
12.1 12.5 14.3 12.7 
New equity 11.0 11.3 13.1 11.5 
Debt 9.1 9.3 11.0 9.6 
Average 10.9 11.3 13.0 11.5 
Author´s computation 
Interestingly, the inclusion of personal taxes reduces the overall cost of capital (p) from 
12.7% to 11.5%. In spite of it, the table shows high required rates of return and this may 
discourage investment, as mentioned. As in most countries, debt is the best financial choice, 
followed by new equity and retained profits. Buildings and machinery have basically the 
same return while investment in inventories requires higher rates. 
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Note that dividend exemption is not enough to make new equity finance as attractive as 
debt. Nevertheless, dividend exemption makes the option for new equity less costly than 
retaining profits.  
Step 6: Finding the average tax wedges 
 
This is done by simply subtracting from each cell of the last table the value of  “s” = 9.0%. 
 
Table 4.9: Tax Wedges (p – s) (%) with personal taxes, dividends exempted 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
3.1 3.5 5.3 3.7 
New equity 2.0 2.3 4.1 2.5 
Debt 0.1 0.3 2.0 0.6 
Average 1.9 2.2 4.0 2.5 
Author´s computation 
As derived, the overall averaged tax wedge in Brazil is almost the same as in OECD (2.5% 
for Brazil against 2.3% for OECD). This time there are not negative tax wedges on debt 
finance because of the influence of the tax on interest. Equity and retention have now lower 
tax wedges under the influence of dividend exemption and capital gains taxation only at the 
time of realization. The above results show an unbalanced tax system that requires higher 
costs of capital than in OECD countries. Next, we include INE in our computations. 
4.3 Computing Tax Wedges with INE 
 
Interest on net equity (INE) is not usual in OECD countries. Nevertheless, it has been seen 
as a successful policy for most Brazilian tax experts. From expression 19, we derive the 
cost of capital for new equity with INE included, assuming that ε is 50%, that is, half of 
distributed profits in Brazil each year is on the form of dividends and the other half is INE. 
Thus, following all the previous steps we come up with the values of “p” and the tax 
wedges, INE included:  
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Table 4.10a: Pre-tax Rates of Return “p” (%) with Personal Taxes  and INE  
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
12.1 12.5 14.3 12.7 
New equity 10.9 11.2 13.0 11.4 
Debt 9.1 9.3 11.0 9.6 
Average 10.9 11.2 13.0 11.5 
Author´s computation 
Table 4.10b: Tax wedges (p-s) with Personal Taxes and INE  (%) 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
3.1 3.5 5.3 3.7 
New equity 1.9 2.2 4.0 2.4 
Debt 0.1 0.3 2.0 0.6 
Average 1.9 2.2 4.0 2.5 
Author´s computation 
Table 4.10c: Effective tax rates (p-s)/p  with Personal Taxes and INE  (%) 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
25.5 27.8 36.9 28.6 
New equity 17.3 19.8 30.6 20.9 
Debt 0.6 3.3 18.1 5.2 
Average 15.9 18.4 29.7 19.7 
Author´s computation 
 
Clearly, INE causes a small change in new equity results. Though INE is deductible from 
the tax base as debt, it cannot provide tax neutrality between equity and debt. If we suppose 
all profits are distributed with INE, then new equity results above change slightly, a 
reduction of 0.1 p.p. for each type of asset. These results suggest that INE causes a small 
reduction on the cost of capital for new equity. 
How can it be possible if INE is assumed to have the same tax treatment as interest from 
loans ? We have seen from section 3 that INE expressions are very different from debt 
expressions for the company discount rate. The essential difference is that INE is used to 
compensate shareholders while interest is paid to third parties. When the legislation allowed 
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deduction from the tax base for INE and imposed the same retained at source tax rate of 
15%, one can imagine INE warrants a neutral tax treatment between equity and debt. 
However, this thought does not take into account the different opportunity costs of such 
financial alternatives as for lenders the company discount rate is given while for 
shareholders this rate varies according to their decisions. Such differences can be confirmed 
observing expressions 11 and 19 for the company discount rate for debt and equity, 
respectively. For debt, the influence of deduction from the tax base is straight while for INE 
this effect is cushioned by other variables.    
If the Brazilian tax system favored debt, INE design seemed to oppose this trend. But 
perhaps the main reason investors preferred bonds rather than shares had nothing to do with 
taxes but with the high interest rates in Brazil. 
In sum, further studies shall be undertaken to understand the role of INE in the economy. In 
this paper though, INE contribution to tax neutrality seemed to be small.       
 
4.4 Simulations 
 
Until now we have been computing the cost of capital and tax wedges inserting parameters 
in the King-Fullerton equations that approach the Brazilian economic environment. In this 
section we try to analyze policy alternatives to reach tax neutrality by changing the model 
parameters. 
 
4.4.1 Changing the Interest Rate 
 
As noted, the very high required pre-tax rates of return in Brazil may be a barrier to 
investors. This is not a surprise, given the high real interest rate in that country. In the 
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previous calculations, we used a nominal interest rate of 16% and inflation rate of 4.5%. 
This leads to a real interest rate of 11%, which is more than two times the rate of 5% used 
by the OECD. If Brazil could reduce its real interest rate to 5%, then the results would be23: 
Table 4.9a: Pre-tax Rates of Return at 5% of real interest rate 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
5.3% 5.4% 6.9% 5.7% 
New equity 4.4% 4.5% 5.9% 4.8% 
Debt 3.6% 3.6% 5.0% 3.9% 
Average 4.6% 4.7% 6.2% 5.0% 
Author´s computation 
Table 4.9b: Tax Wedges with 5% of real interest rate 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 1.9% 
New equity 0.7% 0.7% 2.1% 1.0% 
Debt -0.2% -0.2% 1.2% 0.1% 
Average  0.9% 0.9% 2.4% 1.2% 
Author´s computation 
These results suggest that a reduction in the interest rate would benefit real investment in 
Brazil because the tax wedge would be half reduced, from 2.8% to 1.4%. Note that the 
higher the interest rate, the higher the tax wedge, confirming the influence of the interest 
rate on the tax burden. This would not be visible without taking into account opportunity 
costs, which are key in the King-Fullerton method. With eyes closed to opportunity costs, 
one could compare the taxation of financial alternatives such as debt and equity by simply 
looking at the tax bases and tax rates and conclude wrong. It is vital to understand that 
rational investors should always compute opportunity costs and as long as the money 
market arises as an option for them, it is inevitable to have the interest rate as an important 
variable with influence on the tax system, even though its administration is out of control of 
fiscal authorities.   
                                                 
23 The starting point for tables 4.9 were tables 4.8, i.e. including INE and personal taxation. 
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A reduction of the interest rate, as supposed, is not as simple though. If, on one hand, it can 
benefit real investment, on the other hand it can be catastrophic for economic stability. 
Because of this, monetary authorities are very careful given the recent history of persistent 
high inflation rates in Brazil. In fact, after a long period of very high interest rates24, this 
year the Brazilian Central Bank started reducing the official rate as inflationary pressures 
seemed to be under control. However, the imminent rise of rates in the US and mounting oil 
prices are threatening further decreases in the Brazilian interest rate.  
 
4.4.2  Taxing Dividends at a Rate of 15% (moving to a classical system)  
 
Some critics say that dividends should be taxed in Brazil. For them, dividends are well 
included in the income concept and there is no reason for being exempted. Furthermore, 
they use to call for equity reasons as far as capitalists receive dividends and they are often 
at the top of the income distribution pyramid. Critics also say that to compensate loss in 
revenues, government tax heavily workers and the poor.  
As it is said in the Introduction, it is not under the scope of this work to discuss equity. 
Nonetheless, we are interested to know what happens to tax wedges when dividends are 
taxed. For this purpose, we revisit expression 14: 
ρ (1 – md ) θ + zπ =  i /( 1 + ωi)      (14) 
If we suppose a retained at source tax on dividends we get:  
[ρ * θ / (1+ ωd )] + zπ =  i /( 1 + ωi)     (14a) 
                                                 
24 Nominal interest rates reached 26% a year. 
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Where ωd is the tax rate on dividends which we can suppose is 15%, the same rate we used 
for capital gains and interest. Note that we have been using the same rate for different 
sources of finance (debt, equity and retention) to show that even though rates may be the 
same, the tax system is not necessarily neutral as we have seen in previous tables. The tax 
discrimination variable (θ) can be expressed as: 
θ = 1 / (1 + ωd)      (22) 
 Remember that θ is now the net dividend in the hands of shareholders and it takes into 
account the 15% retention at source at the corporate level (ωd).25 Hence, the expression for 
the company discount rate when there is a retained at source 15% tax on dividends is: 
ρ =  [i /( 1 + ωi)  -  zπ] * (1+ ωd  )2                              (21) 
Now we are able to find the pre-tax rate of return to capital “p” for new equity with 
dividends being taxed. Suppose, for a while, there is no INE. Using our initial parameters 
the results are: 
Table 4.10a: The Cost of Capital “p” with 15% withholding tax on dividends 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
12.1% 12.5% 14.3% 12.7% 
New equity 16.2% 16.8% 18.7% 16.9% 
Debt 9.1% 9.3% 11.0% 9.6% 
Weighted avg. 11.4% 11.8% 13.6% 12.0% 
Author´s computation 
 
Table 4.10b: Tax Wedges (p – s) with 15% withholding tax on dividends 
                                                 
25 Note that if dividend taxation were such as in the USA, that is, dividends are subject to income tax at the 
personal level (the individual must register received dividends on his/hers tax return), then θ would equal one 
(1) because there would not have additional dividend taxation at the corporate level. Since different values of 
θ lead to differences on the return to capital, we understand that for investment analisys retention at source 
makes difference when computing tax wedges.  
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 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
3.1% 3.5% 5.3% 3.7% 
New equity 7.2% 7.8% 9.7% 7.9% 
Debt 0.1% 0.3% 2.0% 0.6% 
Weighted avg. 2.4% 2.8% 4.6% 3.0% 
Author´s computation 
These tables show that a 15% tax on dividends would worse the return to investors and the 
tax system would be even far from neutrality. In particular, new equity would now be the 
worst option for investors.  
Dividend taxation as close to a classical system as we have simulated is no longer usual in 
the world unless the case of a big economy such as the USA. Moving away from a classical 
system would probably not change investors behavior in the USA. In opposition to it, for 
small open economies it is sometimes mandatory to change their monetary or fiscal policies 
so as to achieve their investment and growth goals. In fact, many European countries are 
using integrated systems with imputation or split rates rather than exemption.  
For Brazil, imputation or split rates would probably raise the complexity of the tax system, 
which is already very complex. Of course, the complex is the tax system, the higher its 
administrative cost and the larger the breaches for corruption.   
Anyway, from tables 4.10 it is clear that taxing dividends at 15% would only change the 
return on new issues, which become less attractive. This policy alone would not correct any 
distortions among financial alternatives. 
 
 
  
 
 42
4.4.3 Raising the Corporate Statutory Tax Rate 
In our previous computations we took τ = 25% as if as though Brazil has a single rate. This 
is not true. Brazil corporate tax schedule is such that a 15% rate applies to all companies 
and additionally a 10% rate applies on the profits that exceeds R$ 240,000.00. Thus, the 
rates vary according to companies’ profits. Also, since all corporations are required to pay 
the social security contribution on net income (CSLL) at a rate of 9% before the corporate 
tax, we find that corporations are indeed taxed at a higher rate, which is close to 34%. If we 
use this rate (τ = 34%) and the actual nominal interest rate (16%), we find: 
Table 4.11a: Pre-tax rate of return to capital “p” with 34% of corporate tax rate 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
13.4% 14.0% 16.8% 14.3% 
New equity 11.0% 11.5% 14.1% 11.8% 
Debt 8.2% 8.5% 11.0% 8.9% 
Weighted avg. 11.4% 11.8% 14.5% 12.2% 
Author´s computation 
Table 4.11b: Tax Wedges (p – s) with 34% of corporate tax rate 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
4.4% 5.0% 7.8% 5.3% 
New equity 2.0% 2.5% 5.1% 2.8% 
Debt -0.8% -0.5% 2.0% -0.1% 
Weighted avg. 2.4% 2.8% 5.5% 3.2% 
Author´s computation 
 
It seems that this policy would enhance the existing distortions among financial alternatives 
and raise the overall tax wedge. It would also warrant a negative tax wedge on buildings 
and machinery financed by debt. A negative tax wedge means that the tax system is 
supporting part of the cost of capital for debt investors. Obviously, this does not seem to be 
good policy and though it is desirable to have a low tax wedge on investment it cannot be 
negative since taxpayers should not be responsible for private investment.  
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Because interest is deductible from the tax base, the higher the corporate tax rate, the lower 
the tax wedge for debt finance. Though INE has the same privilege, the effect for new 
equity is pervasive as the average tax wedge for this source of capital raises from 2.8% to 
3.3%. As mentioned, the effect of INE on new equity is not as powerful as interest for debt. 
Hence, increasing corporate tax rates, as sometimes advised to raise government revenues 
and favor the tax system equity, may have side effects as, for instance, an unexpected 
stimulus to debt finance.    
 
4.4.4 The Effect of a Higher Inflation in Brazil 
 
A higher inflation rate has usually an ambiguous effect. It is worth study what would 
happen if inflation in Brazil went up to 10%. 
 
 
Table 4.12a: Pre-tax rates of return with τ = 34%, i = 16%, π = 10% 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
7.2% 6.4% 10.4% 7.7% 
New equity 4.9% 4.1% 7.9% 5.3% 
Debt 2.7% 1.8% 5.5% 3.1% 
Weighted avg. 5.4% 4.6% 8.4% 5.8% 
Author´s computation 
Table 4.12b: Tax wedges with τ = 34%, i = 16%, π = 10% 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
2.8% 2.6% 6.9% 3.6% 
New equity 0.6% 0.2% 4.4% 1.3% 
Debt -1.5% -2.0% 1.9% -0.9% 
Weighted avg. 1.0% 0.7% 4.9% 1.8% 
Author´s computation 
 
A rate of inflation of 10% in Brazil would reduce the cost of capital for the tax system. In 
fact, the major effect of a high rate of inflation would be as if actual rates of interest (i) have 
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been decreased. Of course, the King-Fullerton model does not compute the pervasive 
effects of a high inflation to the economy and the conclusion above is very limited.  
 
4.4.5 Changing the Proportion of Inventories Submitted to FIFO 
 
In our fore calculations, we assumed that all inventories were valued using the FIFO 
method but Brazil also allows valuation by the average cost and by the price minus the 
marginal profit as well. As the use of FIFO indexes stocks, it is reasonable that companies 
try to avoid it in order to pay less tax. In the absence of real data, if we suppose that only 
20% of stocks are valued with FIFO and 5% of real interest, then we have the following: 
Table 4.13a: Pre-tax rates of return with τ = 34%, r = 5% and 20% of stocks with FIFO 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
6.3% 6.1% 6.7% 6.3% 
New equity 4.1% 3.8% 4.2% 4.0% 
Debt 2.0% 1.5% 1.7% 1.8% 
Weighted avg. 4.6% 4.3% 4.7% 4.5% 
Author´s computation 
Table 4.13b: Tax wedges with τ = 34%, r = 5% and 20% of stocks with FIFO 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
2.8% 2.6% 3.1% 2.8% 
New equity 0.6% 0.2% 0.6% 0.5% 
Debt -1.5% -2.0% -1.8% -1.7% 
Weighted avg. 1.0% 0.7% 1.1% 1.0% 
Author´s computation 
 
 
The results show that this policy would favor tax neutrality regarding types of asset. 
Inventories would improve their rates of return. Future studies should verify the actual 
proportion of stock valued with FIFO in Brazil and if the adoption of LIFO would have 
positive effect to asset-type tax neutrality as it is used in many other countries.  
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4.4.6 Exempting Capital Gains 
 
Many countries do not tax capital gains on retained profits as an increase in the value of 
shares. Others do but only if the asset is sold after a certain period of time has passed. In 
Brazil, capital gains are taxed only at the time of realization. Considering that, according to 
the new view, mature companies prefer to finance their expansions with retained earnings. 
If this is true, then exempting taxes on capital gains could help encourage investment.  
The above tables show that retained earnings would require the higher rates of return. If 
Brazil eliminates taxes on capital gains, the response would be: 
Table 4.14b: Pre-tax rates of return with τ = 34%, r = 5% 20% of stocks with FIFO and z = 0 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
6.0% 5.8% 6.3% 6.0% 
New equity 4.9% 4.6% 5.1% 4.9% 
Debt 2.0% 1.5% 1.7% 1.8% 
Weighted avg. 4.5% 4.2% 4.6% 4.4% 
Author´s computation 
 
 
Table 4.14b: Tax wedges with τ = 34%, r = 5%, 20% of stocks with FIFO and z = 0 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
2.4% 2.2% 2.8% 2.5% 
New equity 1.4% 1.1% 1.6% 1.3% 
Debt -1.5% -2.0% -1.8% -1.7% 
Weighted avg. 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 
Author´s computation 
 
 
Besides lowering slightly the overall tax wedge, this policy reduces the gap between 
retaining profits and issuing of new shares. Nevertheless, debt is still the best financial 
choice.   
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4.4.7 Raising the Effective Tax Rate on Interest  
Currently, Brazil taxes interest income at a rate of 15% which is lower than in most OECD 
countries.26 If Brazil changes its rate to 25%, this is what happens: 
 
Table 4.15: Tax wedges with τ = 34%, r = 5%, 20% of stocks with FIFO, z = 0 and wi = 25% 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
2.1% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 
New equity 2.3% 2.0% 2.2% 2.2% 
Debt 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 
Weighted avg. 1.5% 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 
Author´s computation 
 
Results show there is almost tax neutrality between new equity and retention as well as 
asset-type neutrality. There is also an acceptable level of the tax wedge. Debt finance is still 
the best option for investors with tax wedges close to zero, even with the increase on the tax 
rate on interest. Hence, a 25% retained at source tax rate on interest income combined with 
a full exemption on capital gains and dividends would reduce tax distortions among asset 
type and funds for investment in Brazil. However, we are supposing a low interest rate, 
which is not true. If the actual nominal interest rate is 16%, then the level of the tax wedge 
increases to 3.0%, on average, and the cost of capital, represented by the pre-tax rates of 
return, increases too to 11.0%, on average. Obviously, the values of “p” are higher now but, 
again, there are no different incentives among the sources of finance, though high values of 
“p” lowers the stimulus for investment.  
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Tax rates on interest: US (average) 28%, UK average 22%, Switzerland 30.8%, Sweden 30%, Spain 31.5%, 
Luxembourg 24%, Greece 25% for residents. 
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4.4.8 Achieving tax neutrality with low tax wedges  
Tax neutrality is not easy to achieve. Calibration is hard because the model parameters are 
many. Moreover, changes in the real tax system need a lot of political work. Because of this, 
for the purpose of this study, we look at some alternatives to improve tax neutrality in 
Brazil, even though such alternatives may not be easily acceptable in the real world. We 
start by redefining our assumptions.  
Let us suppose that the real interest rate is exogenous and close to 5%. We have seen that 
the lower the interest rate, the lower the tax wedges and for this scenario tax wedges should 
be around 1.5%, as fore calculations showed. In this case, the tax system would impose a 
small barrier on real investment.  
In previous tables, debt finance always appears as the best financial choice, presenting low 
tax wedges and sometimes even negative ones. In order to make debt finance tax wedges 
close to their correspondents of equity and retention, we can raise them a little, while 
decreasing their correspondents. Then, to move up debt finance tax wedges it is needed to 
lower the corporate tax rate and/or to raise the tax rate on interest.  
On the equity side, we assume dividends are still exempted and INE keeps the same tax 
treatment as before, that is, INE is deductible from the tax base and is taxed at the same rate 
as interest. The proportion of dividends and INE distribution is still assumed to be 50% and 
the inflation rate is still 4.5%. Thus, we are assuming there is no room for equity policies. 
For retention, the statutory tax rate on capital gains shall be increased to compensate for the 
loss in revenues caused by the lower corporate taxation. Note that while the corporate tax 
decreases, taxation on interest and capital gains increase so as to keep government revenues 
relatively stable. Though retention appeared in the tables as the worse option for corporate 
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finance, with lower corporate taxation the trend is for lower tax wedges on retention as well. 
Thus, the increase on the statutory tax rate on capital gains in this new scenario will not 
harm retention. 
Asset-type neutrality is achieved allowing better conditions for inventories as machineries 
and buildings seem to have close tax wedges in Brazil. For inventories, a reduction on the 
stocks valued with FIFO would favor tax neutrality among assets. 
After this introduction, we are able to establish the new model parameters:  
i. the real interest rate as 5%, 
ii. the inflation rate as 4.5%, 
iii. the corporate tax rate as 18%, 
iv. the statutory the tax rate on dividends as zero, 
v. tax rate on capital gains as 30%,  
vi. the statutory tax rate on interest and INE as 31%,  
vii. the proportion of stocks valued with FIFO as 10%, 
viii. the proportion of profits distributed as dividends as 50%, 
ix. the statutory depreciation rates as 10% for machinery and 4% for buildings, 
x. the economic depreciation rates as 8.2% for machineries and 2.7% for buildings, 
xi. the proportion of capital gains realized each year as 10% 
 
The outcome is the following: 
Table 4.16: Tax wedges – balanced tax system with low interest rate 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Weighted avg. 
Retained 
earnings 
1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 
New equity 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 
Debt 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 
Weighted avg. 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 
Author´s computation 
   
Note that even if there are high tax rates on capital gains and interest, the level of the tax 
wedges is still low. 
In a scenario of high interest rates though, these parameters do not satisfy for tax neutrality 
besides imposing a high cost on capital. Averaged tax wedges rise to 2.4%, 2.8% e 3.4% for 
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debt, retention and new equity, respectively, when the nominal interest rate is 16% (real 
interest rate of 11%). In this case, one way to achieve tax neutrality is to raise the corporate 
tax rate to 20%, eliminate INE, keep dividends exemption, exempt capital gains, forbid 
FIFO, make the tax rate on interest as 25% and the new results are:    
Table 4.17: Tax wedges – balanced tax system with high interest rate 
 Machinery Buildings Inventories Average 
Retained 
earnings 
1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 1.7% 
New equity 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 1.7% 
Debt 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 1.7% 
Average 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 1.7% 
Author´s computation 
 
The tax system is now neutral to the sources of finance but not for assets. Lowering the 
corporate tax rate could have a positive effect on inventories for equity and retention, but 
not for debt, which would worsen all its results. Asset-type neutrality could be achieved by 
changing depreciation rates for machinery and buildings and providing special allowances 
for inventories. However, a lower interest rate would eliminate the need for complex 
solutions.  
Results suggest that with high interest rates tax policy is less effective to improve tax 
neutrality in Brazil. The problem is how to reduce new equity tax wedges as dividends are 
already exempted? Note that eliminating INE favored tax neutrality in the last scenario.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
In this paper we have developed a tool for the analysis of the Brazilian corporate capital 
taxation at both the corporate and personal levels in terms of its impact on domestic 
investment decisions. Based on the King-Fullerton equations, our model computes the rates 
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of return to capital before and after taxation, the correspondent tax wedges and effective tax 
rates. With appropriate settings to approach the real Brazilian economic environment, the 
model responded to simulations for the study of the status quo as well as of policy 
alternatives. Our goal was to achieve tax neutrality among different sources of finance and 
different types of assets, assuming the tax system should not distort investment decisions 
for the efficiency of the economic system, although the model is consistent for testing 
biased policies, if necessary. Indeed, policy makers can use (and improve) this tool to test 
tax policy options before implementation on the real world.   
In our simulations, we found that Brazilian income tax system distorts incentives for 
allocation of capital among assets and sources of funds. Companies have a better return if 
they choose to finance their projects with debt and the cost of inventories is probably higher 
than purchasing machinery and buildings. Also, the cost of capital and the tax wedges here 
are higher than usually found in the OECD area. Other important conclusions emerging 
from our study are: 
I. the tax system impact on investment depend heavily on the interest rate, though this is not 
under control of fiscal authorities. The higher the interest rate, the higher the tax wedges 
and effective tax rates on capital income, discouraging investment.27 The influence of the 
interest rate on the performance of the tax system can be explained by the opportunity 
costs investors face when deciding among different investment options. In an 
environment of high real interest rates, tax neutrality becomes hard to achieve and the 
incentive to debt finance becomes much more intense than to others sources of finance, 
                                                 
27 The conclusion that a lower interest rate would favor investment is limited to the scope of this study, i.e., 
the tax system efficiency. For a broader approach, one has to discuss the role of the interest rate on other 
issues that may affect investment, such as the stabilization policy or the effect of the interest rate on public 
debt.  
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such as equity (new shares) and retention of profits for reinvestment. On the other hand, 
with low interest rates, tax neutrality becomes easier to achieve with tax policy tools.  
II. the interest on net equity (INE) have shown poor impact on the cost of capital for new 
equity. This result seems contrasting with common sense as INE has been well accepted 
by the business community. Created, perhaps, with the aim of strengthening equity and 
the formation of capital stock, this policy seems to be impotent to make equity as 
attractive as debt. If the model is right and the tested hypothesis enough, then INE has to 
be changed or replaced as it can only be serving to favor tax planning. If not, then we 
suggest further studies on INE using real data in order to verify its effect on equity 
finance; 
III. tax variables have cross effects. For instance, a change in the statutory tax rate on interest 
influences not only debt but the three sources of finance. In the same way, the statutory 
tax rate on capital gains has influence not only on capital gains but on the incentive for 
new equity too. Changes in the corporate tax rate affects return on inventories; 
IV. of the three sources of companies funds, debt allows the most effective responses to 
variable changes to lower the tax wedges on investment while equity has the worst 
response. Special care has to be taken by legislators when granting tax incentives 
affecting debt finance because it is easily co-sponsored by taxpayers, as negative tax 
wedges have come out in our simulations ; 
V. in most of our simulations, retention of earnings appeared as the worst financial option. A 
reduction on the statutory tax rate on capital gains would favor retention while harming 
new equity; 
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VI. dividend exemption contributes to lower equity tax wedges, approaching debt. However, 
this policy alone is not enough to achieve tax neutrality;  
VII. the proportion of stocks valued with FIFO have a high impact on the cost of capital 
regarding inventories. Given that the use of FIFO method tax inflation indexed stocks, an 
alternative could be the LIFO method. The more the tax on stocks is indexed, the less 
attractive are inventories in relation to other kinds of assets.  
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